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EMORY UNIVERSITY SESQUICENTENNIAL
COLLOQUIUM
CREATIVITY AND RESPONSIBILITY: PERSPECTIVES
ON COVENANT, CONTRACT AND THE
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
by
Howard 0. Hunter*
Emory University celebrated its 150th birthday in December of
1986. To mark its sesquicentennial the University scheduled a
number of events during the 1986-87 academic year. Among these
were a series of scholarly exchanges that involved various members
of the University faculty. The papers that follow are the products
of the first of the Sesquicentennial Colloquia. The participants
represented a wide range of disciplines: theology, law, business ad-
ministration, and political science.'
The essential subject of the colloquium was the degree to which
the learning of humane disciplines, such as theology and philoso-
phy, intersect with and guide the development and application of
rules of law. The consideration of this general subject took place
within a specific discussion of methods for the resolution of dis-
putes, especially disputes that arise from intimate relationships.
The interplay of theory and praxis led to a lively debate among the
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale
University.
' The principal papers were presented by Professor Everett of the Candler School of
Theology and Professor Terrell of the School of Law. The respondents were Professor
Karen O'Connor of the Political Science Department, Professor Roderick Gilkey of the
School of Business Administration, and Mr. Tom Bertrand, Secretary of the University.
After the colloquium and in response to some of the issues raised during the discussion, Mr.
John Witte prepared an additional essay that also appears in this issue. Mr. Witte is the
Director of the Law and Religion Program at Emory University. I served as moderator -
author.
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participants that reflected the constant tension in American soci-
ety between individual and community interests.
In his paper, Professor Everett outlines an argument that has
been made in one guise or another for centuries: individual actors
are members of a larger community whether they like it or not,
and the traditions of that community are important to an under-
standing of the individual's role and rights. Everett's community is
one that is defined by reference to God and to the overarching con-
cept of covenant. He argues for a reaffirmation of the concept of
covenant and suggests that such a reaffirmation would help to di-
minish the atomization of individuals and to smooth the resolution
of disputes by emphasizing notions of compromise and community.
Professor Terrell, ever the lawyer, does not disagree with Ever-
ett's point that there is a community that is important to the defi-
nition of the individual. Terrell's community, however, is not based
on a covenant with God but on secular rules of law. The law is the
community. Law defines the community, governs it, and is the es-
sential protector of the individual as well as the community. In
what comes close to a polemic against the currently popular "alter-
native dispute resolution,"2 Terrell argues the importance of the
law to the protection of rights. Picking up on this theme, Professor
O'Connor suggests that the procedures often criticized as unneces-
sarily complex ("inhumane") in courts of law protect those who
most need protection by assuring them of due process and by
preventing the automatic application of community norms that
might be inimical to the interests of the individual.'
Professor Gilkey is correct in noting that Terrell's paper is con-
servative; indeed, it might be called profoundly conservative. But
Everett's argument is also conservative. Both seek to identify and
to protect those elements that are essential to the health of a just
2 Loosely speaking, this refers to any extra-judicial method for the settling of disputes.
More particularly, there are an increasing number of informal panels that provide an arbi-
trator or mediator for disputants who agree to submit their disputes to this form of settle-
ment rather than to a court.
I Hers is the long respected argument that adversarial proceedings, rules, hearings, and
the rule of law protect the minority from the community norms defined by the insensitive
and sometimes oppressive majority.
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and humane society. Because of that, there is more that is common
to the two papers than may first appear.
Everett sets up his argument by drawing a contrast between con-
tract and covenant. Contract is quintessentially the law of the indi-
vidualist in Everett's scheme. Covenant represents the common
strands of community. In this framework contract partners are es-
sentially antagonistic and each strives to maximize his selfish in-
terests in the transaction that is the subject of the contract. There
is a great deal of truth in this model of contract. For example, the
law does not attach fault to the breach of a contract. To the con-
trary, the rules of damages encourage what modern commentators
refer to as the "efficient breach" which occurs when there is a bad
deal and it is better to cut losses and to start anew.4 The classic
statement is by Holmes: "The duty to keep a contract at common
law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not
keep it, - and nothing else."' 5 This is a cold, bloodless approach
that has its utility in commercial dealings, but that may seem in-
appropriate for more personal relations such as those between
spouses. Therein lies much of Everett's concern, for he uses mar-
riage as the relationship in which contract, as a model for pure
individualism, is particularly inappropriate.
It is in the use of marriage as an example that Everett moves
onto shaky ground. Marriage and other intimate, personal relation-
ships are not now and never have been governed by the model of
contract described by Everett.' In the Anglo-American tradition,
4 See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 88-90 (1977); Barton, The Eco-
nomic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972); Birmingham,
Breach of Contract, Damage Measures and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273
(1970); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Princi-
ple: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 554 (1977). Some commentators argue, however, that the rules are too strict and result
in chronic undercompensation which defeats the goal of economic efficiency. See Farber,
Reassessing the Economic Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66
VA. L. REV. 1443 (1980); Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive
Collection, 80 YALE L. J. 1 (1970).
5 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). Professor Charles
Fried has taken specific exception to this view. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 17 (1981).
0 In fairness, Everett recognizes that the "contract of marriage," in the usual sense, is a
preordanied and imposed contract. Care should be taken, however, to distinguish the tradi-
1987]
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marriage has been mich closer to a preordained status. A couple
may freely decide to become married and may negotiate about
time, place and guests, but they cannot actually marry without the
intervention of the state. Once married, the public law defines
many of the most important obligations they have to one another
and especially to any children of the union. They are not free to
break the marriage contract; that can be done only with the per-
mission and the intervention of the state. It is true that divorce is
easier to accomplish today than it was a generation ago, that courts
are more willing today to enforce antenuptial and postnuptial
agreements for the division of property, 7 and that a number of
commentators have argued for greater use of private contract in
ordering marriages.8 Nevertheless, there is little that private par-
ties can do to amend the status of marriage by contract other than
to agree on a division of property, something that each generally
could have accomplished unilaterally by gift or testamentary
devise.
Everett's real concern - properly analyzed - is not with the
intrusion of the model of contract into the relationship of marriage
but with changes in community mores that have weakened the in-
stitution of marriage. Many family disputes do wind up in the
courts, but that is because the courts are the agencies of the state
that have the primary responsibility for handling these kinds of
disputes. They have been given that responsibility by legislatures
that have responded to the popular will of the larger community.
Courts and the rules of law (of contracts as well as other areas of
law) have become a part of the fabric of marital disputes precisely
because of community decisions. It may be that the community
places too much emphasis on the individual and that is certainly a
tional "contract of marriage" from the classical model of contract described by Everett.
7 See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); Posner v. Posner, 233 So.
2d 381 (Fla. 1970), rev'd. on other grounds, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); Scherer v. Scherer,
249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982); Levine v. Levine, 56 N.Y.2d 42, 451 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1982).
See generally, Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).
8 See, e.g., L. WEITZMANN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981); Rheinstein, The Transfor-
mation of Marriage and the Law, 68 Nw. U. L. REv. 463 (1973); Shultz, Contractual Order-
ing of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 204 (1982).
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proper issue for debate.9 In this sense Everett's concern with the
reaffirmation of covenant is apt.
Terrell is largely correct in suggesting that law is the community
in the United States - that law is the covenant of this national
community. In seeking to prove his point, however, he overstates
the case and makes a mistake about contract that is surprisingly
similar to the one made by Everett. He fails to give sufficient con-
sideration to the role of communitarian concerns in defining and
limiting the individual expression of selfish interests in the classi-
cal model of contract. The law of contract is full of principles from
the courts of equity, principles that represent communal notions of
fairness derived largely from norms of behavior established by the
church and by ecclesiastical courts. For example, it is an accepted
principle today that every contract contains an implied duty of
good faith. This good faith obligation may run counter to the idea
that there is no fault in a breach and that a breach is not only
acceptable but should even be encouraged if it contributes to effi-
ciency. Likewise, courts will refuse to enforce contracts that are
unconscionable. Although the issue of unconscionability usually
arises in connection with disputes about the process of negotiation
(did a door-to-door salesman overwhelm a recent immigrant with
hyperbolic descriptions of a product?), it leaves open the possibil-
ity that a court will examine the substance of a private agreement
to determine whether it is objectively fair. The excuse of impracti-
cability contained in UCC section 2-615 is based on community no-
tions of fair dealing more than on strict adherence to the specific
bargain. This list could go on and on, but the point is simple: the
public law imposes on the private law of individual contracts a
large number of communitarian norms of behavior. Admittedly, it
is the law that does this (Terrell's covenant), but these community
based legal norms of behavior reflect more than just the rule of
law. They reflect many of the most important customs of the west-
9 Professor O'Connor makes the point that the understanding of covenant is critical to
Everett's paper. In the past, communitarian concerns that express the communal covenant
have been extremely important in defining the relationship of marriage, but the communi-
tarian principles have not always been just. There greater use of a contract model in mar-
riage is one way in which the roles of the sexes have been equalized.
1987]
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ern liberal tradition as well as the teachings of the church."0
What all this means is that the dichotomy between contract and
covenant suggested by Everett and largely accepted by Terrell is
artificial. Contract did not spring up as some a priori principle of
individualism. It grew from and reflected established traditions
and community needs. The concept of promise and the duty to
keep promises are much older than what we think of as contract
law. The same holds true for trust, bargain and exchange. Contract
law is a creation of the community, and its rules have their roots
deep in the fabric of the community. Certainly it is a means for
private law making and, as such, it is critical to the maximum de-
velopment of individual opportunities. Even in purely commercial
situations, however, there are rules of contract law that represent
the larger interests of the community in the promotion of fair and
just behavior.
Despite this criticism, the distinctions that Everett tries to draw
merit close attention. The glorification of contract, especially in
the late nineteenth century, as the essence of individualism and
the driving force of capitalism makes it a natural object of close
examination in any consideration of the ongoing tension between
individual and community interests. The rules of contract law and
the role of contracts in ordering commercial and personal relation-
ships help to define the intersection of public and private law. To
the extent that public law represents the community's interests,
this intersection identifies the relative importance of private free-
dom of action in defining individuals' roles in various sectors of the
society. Everett's interests go beyond this intersection because his
10 Further study of the points raised by Terrell and Everett in the context of a histori-
cal analysis of the role of equity courts in the development of contract law would be inter-
esting. Many of the early chancellors were clerics and many of the general principles of
equity derive from church teachings. The equity courts were more concerned with doing
justice in a particular case than in setting precedents or in treating similar cases alike. In-
stead of a set of limited remedies, the equity courts had almost unlimited remedial author-
ity to fashion one to fit the circumstance. In a way the equity courts were the alternative
dispute resolution centers of their day. The chancellor intervened in the proceedings almost
in the nature of a mediator. The outcome depended as much on the good behavior of the
petitioner as on the bad behavior of the respondent. The particular issues were reviewed in
light of large principles of fairness that were more a part of what Everett might call the
community covenant than a part of any specific set of legal rules.
538 [Vol. 36
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concern with covenant involves the proper understanding of public
law rules as well as the public/private distinction.
People often are more concerned with how to solve a dispute
than with whether the nature of the dispute is one that involves
more or less concern with community norms of behavior. Full
blown litigation is often time consuming, expensive, emotionally
and physically draining, and unsatisfactory to winner and loser.11
Terrell is correct in noting, however, that the cumbersome proce-
dures of trials do provide the means for the protection and vindi-
cation of individual interests. Advocates of alternatives for formal
dispute resolution have to face two serious questions: One, does the
alternative conserve resources and protect rights? and two, is the
alternative sufficiently predictable and available that it is a realis-
tic option? Any two parties with the inclination to do so can agree
to submit a dispute to a third party arbitrator or mediator instead
of to a court. If there is to be some formal alternative, however, the
questions that Terrell poses are serious. It must be better than
what is now available or there seems little point in seeking an al-
ternative. Furthermore, the cost of an expeditious result should
not be the loss of the opportunity to have a fair chance to present
one's position or to protect one's interests. Terrell's view of litiga-
tion is much like Churchill's view of democracy: It is terrible, but it
is better than anything else.
In another paper that was not a formal part of the Sesquicenten-
nial Colloquium but which developed in part from the discussions
at that gathering, John Witte discusses the Puritan idea of cove-
nant. His paper expands on several of the points implicit in Ever-
ett's paper and assists in an understanding of the nature of cove-
nant as contrasted, for example, with the nature of a common law
commercial contract. Witte's paper also illustrates the importance
of the themes identified in both Terrell's and Everett's papers to
an understanding of the dynamic interactions of religious doc-
trines, social customs and moral philosophy with rules of law and
" Sometimes there is a subtle benefit to delay. Passions cool; the disputants become
involved in other projects; the disagreement begins to seem less important. The result is
likely to be a settlement that is mutually satisfactory. This does not happen all the time,
but it is frequent enough to suggest that a quick trial may not always be the best answer.
1987]
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their application to ordinary human relationships. One of the pri-
mary goals of any university is to spark continued debate and in-
terchange on these kinds of perennial issues. Perhaps these papers
will be the catalysts for even more exchanges.
